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Abstract
China is often suspected of taking over the extraordinary trade relationships that former
colonies had within colonial empires. We detail the three reasons why China’s trade flows
with former colonies could exhibit unexpected levels after independence. Besides potential
preferential bilateral relationships built after independence, the two expected determinants of
trade flows are China’s export capacity and the natural redirection caused by the increase in
country pairs trade costs due to independence. We investigate and quantify the three reasons
explaining the level of former colonies’ trade flows with China. Using sequentially naive
graphical representations and structural gravity equations, we show that methodological
issues can be largely responsible for displaying and estimating abnormaly high trade levels
between former colonies and China. We show that increased trade between these pairs of
countries is the result of coinciding unilateral factors on each side which raise trade with all
partners, instead of being driven by more intense bilateral preferences. We then measure the
reorientation of trade flows from former colonies’ metropoles towards China and show that
independence has produced the expected redistribution: trade flows would be 15% lower
with China, had former colonies not become independent.
JEL Codes: F1, F54.
Keywords: colonial trade, gravity equation, China, multilateral resistance, bilateral effects
1 Introduction
Given its spectacular increase during the second half of the twentieth century, there is nothing
surprising to the extensive coverage on Chinese trade by the press and its large documentation
by government agencies1. While evident reasons for the surge of Chinese trade come to mind,
∗We thank Keith Head and Thierry Mayer for making their data and code available on their gravity handbook
website (https://sites.google.com/site/hiegravity/).
†CEMOI University of La Reunion, 15 avenue Rene Cassin, 97400 St Denis. didier.laurent3@hotmail.com
‡University of Rouen & Paris School of Economics, 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris. pam-
ina.koenig@psemail.eu
1In the Financial Times’ featured themes for example, the word ‘trade’ is four times associated to a country’s
name, and China is one of those. The others ones are the UK, the US, the EU: http://www.ft.com/topics/
themes
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related to its transition towards a market economy (Storesletten and Zilibotti (2014), Keller et al.
(2013)), followed by policy changes in 1992 and the country’s rise as a center for production
for foreign markets (Autor et al. (2013)), the press insists on relating the increasing share
of countries’ imports from China to a change in bilateral preferences with the world’s first
exporter2. As China has not been active in signing free trade agreements since WWII, remaining
explanations include informal channels like business networks, political convergence or even
political influence of China3. Conjectures about extraordinary commercial relationships with
China are indeed particularly strong in the case of countries which have come out of controlled
trade relationships, like former colonies4. Any evidence of abnormaly high commerce with
the newly independent countries provides material for the claim that China is taking over the
specific trade relation that these countries shared with the hegemon. Figure 1, which displays
the absolute level of trade between three ex-colonies5, and respectively their former colonizer
and China, if often interpreted as an impressive catch-up of China with respect to the former
colonial power.
In this paper, we use the gravity equation to quantify the three central determinants of
China-colonies’ trade: traders’ size, bilateral connections, and countries’ accessibility to all
partners. We show that increased trade between these pairs of countries is the result of coinciding
unilateral factors on each side which raise trade with all partners, instead of being driven by
more intense bilateral preferences. Gravity equations have been used to analyse trade flows
since their introduction in economics by Jan Tinbergen in 1962. Although gravity equations
highlight three main determinants of trade, the literature mainly focuses on quantifying bilateral
factors, be they persistent or reversible. Tariffs and trade agreements are examples of countries’
decisions to smooth accessibility among them, and have been investigated among many others
by Carrere (2006), Baier and Bergstrand (2007), and most recently by Limão (2016). Long-
run determinants of trade flows have been analysed by Melitz and Toubal (2014) (common
language), Lewer and Van den Berg (2007) (institutions and religions), or Disdier and Head
(2008) (distance).
The three important building blocks of gravity that we investigate all represent a channel
possibly leading to the pattern observed in figure 1. The first channel are the sizes of trading
economies. China is an extraordinary and growing participant in world production in the post
2In September 2009 the China Business Review reports “Economic ties between China and India will play a
large role in one of the most important bilateral relationships in the world by 2020. Bilateral trade has already
surged from under 3 billion USD in 2000 to nearly 52 billion USD in 2008.” (http://www.chinabusinessreview.
com/china-and-india-greater-economic-integration/)
3“How China Uses Trade to Influence the South China Sea”, in https://www.stratfor.com/image/
how-china-uses-trade-influence-south-china-sea, or “Is China becoming Africa’s new colonial master?”,
by the BBC in 2012 (http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-18901656)
4http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2015/11/24/china_s_role_in_africa_is_exciting_for_china_
but_is_it_as_great_for_africa.html
5We choose these three former colonies since they have the advantage of having available data for most years
in the sample.
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WWII period. This is rarely taken into account in non-academic graphical illustrations of
Chinese trade. We first complement figure 1 with the evolution of production for the Chinese
economy, and show that the abnormal character of the curve disappears. The observed catch-up
seems to be very well explained by the comparative evolution of production and export capacities
of the colonizer and China. Once the exporter’s capacity is taken into account, the evolution of
bilateral China-colonies trade doesn’t seem to urgently call for bilateral explanations.
The second channel for trade increase in gravity equations lies in bilateral accessibility
terms. We investigate the existence of a change in bilateral links between China and former
colonies, using a structural gravity equation. We estimate bilateral China-colonies dummies,
representing potential reasons for “excess trade” between these partners after independence.
In related papers analyzing the decrease of trade between colonies and their hegemon, Head
et al. (2010) and Lavallée and Lochard (2015) also estimate the effect of independence between
ex-colonies and a wider group of Rest-of the World partners, and find contrasting results. Head
et al. (2010) show that countries that become independent trade in average less with third
countries. Lavallée and Lochard (2015) on the contrary find an increase in former colonies’ trade
flows to the rest of the world. In the case of China, we fail to find any statistically significant
effect of independence with the colonies, in particular when using the theory-consistent gravity
equation and hence controlling for unilateral and bilateral unobserved determinants of trade.
The evolution of former colonies’ trade with China during the second half of the nineteenth
century is fully explained by the usual gravity determinants, and no bilateral post-independence
specificity stands out.
The third channel for trade variation is the indirect effect on all countries in the world,
including China, of changes in trade policy and political relations between colonies and the
colonizer at independence. This effect operates through “multilateral resistance” terms in the
gravity equation, which dispatch the redistribution of trade flows. This effect can only be
quantified using trade flows simulations, because predicted trade needs to incorporate the new
multilateral resistances resulting from the change of bilateral trade costs. There are few examples
in the literature of such simulations taking into account third countries’ effects: Glick and Taylor
(2010) investigate the direct and indirect costs of military conflict, and Anderson and Yotov
(2010) compute the impact of an agreement on the internal trade of Canadian provinces. In our
case, former colonies went through an important variation of their main trade costs with the
metropole when becoming independent, and therefore represent an interesting case on which
to study the reallocation of expenditure. The gravity equation shows that trade naturally
redistributes towards all trade partners following such a drastic trade cost change. We quantify
this channel by using the structural gravity model to simulate factual trade flows, as well as a
counterfactual trade matrix in the scenario where independence would not have happened. The
difference between the two simulations provides a measure of how much trade was redirected
because of independence, and thus allows to quantify whether the increase in former colonies’
3
Figure 1: Imports from colonizer and from China
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import share from China can be attributed to a change in the multilateral accessibility of all
countries. Our results show that in the year 2010, independence increased trade with China
by 15 % , compared to a hypothetical situation where those countries would have remained
colonies until that same year. This result shows that the multilateral resistance terms of the
gravity equation play here a central role in explaining the variation of trade flows, whereas
they usually are considered as a nuisance term to be controlled in the estimation by the use
of fixed-effects. These terms, required for theoretical consistence of the gravity equation, have
been central in the renewal of academic interest for this empirical tool (Head and Mayer (2014),
Costinot and Rodŕıguez-Clare (2013)). Our paper shows a case where their inclusion is critical
in appropriate understanding of empirical trade patterns.
Our paper shows that out of the three explanations for the surge in former colonies’ share
of imports from China, only the two reasons related to monadic determinants are in effect.
The higher trade shares are not explained by the development of bilateral links involving only
China and the ex-colonies. Bilateral factors typically refer to extraordinary reasons to trade
in contrast with the ordinary reasons which are the size of partners and their access to other
countries. According to our findings, there is nothing exceptional in the level of trade involving
China and the former colonized States.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the data on world-
wide trade flows and independence events. Section 3 graphs and estimates the (absence of)
specificity of Chinese trade flows with former colonies following independence. In section 4
we compute the counterfactual trade of ex-colonies with China, had the former countries not
become independent. Section 5 concludes.
2 Data
To estimate whether China’s trade with formerly colonized countries shows unexpected trends
or level, we primarily use the dataset made available by Head et al. (2010). They compile in
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particular data on countries’ trade flows during the second half of the nineteenth century up
to 2006, and data on independence years, for all metropoles. After listing the data sources, we
illustrate graphically the trade flows that are of interest for us, hence former colonies’s trade
with their metropole before and after independence, and the same countries with China.
2.1 Independence and definition of colonies
Information on the independence dates of countries come from the CIA World Factbook. The
raw data extracted by Head et al. (2010) contains the name of countries which have been colo-
nized, the name of the colonizer, and the date of independence. We proceed to two adjustments
with respect to the original independence data. First, we retain only the latest independence
date for the countries that have been colonized by different colonizers. This allows to keep the
date at which sovereignty was effectively achieved. Mauritius, for example, became independent
from France in 1810, however it became fully independent in 1968 from the UK. Dropping early
independence dates reduces the number of country pairs with colonial histories from 249 to 194,
and shifts the beginning of the database from 1710 (when Estonia ceased to be part of Sweden)
to 1804 (independence of Hati from France).
Still, the data comprises independence dates in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Our
investigation of Chinese commercial relations with former-colonies concentrates on the second
part of the nineteenth century, i.e. on countries which gained sovereignty after 1939. This
allows to retain the recent transformations of the Chinese economy, and also to let aside the
independence dates of the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, whose nature largely differ
from the post-WWII context. The first countries to become independent after this date are
Lebanon from France in 1943, Iceland from Denmark in 1944, and the Japanese colonies at the
end of WWII (Koreas and Taiwan). 162 colonized countries figure in the final database, out
of which 152 whose separation takes place between 1939 and 1999. The end of the Russian
Federation in 1991 and five more isolated returns to sovereignty (Eritrea 1993, Palau 1994,
Bosnia-Herzegovina 1995, Hong-Kong 1997 and Macau 1999) are the last events before the end
of the century. Figure (2) displays the number of countries that became independent over the
years, with mention of their region. Immediately apparent is the high concentration of events
in the early 1960s (most French colonies of Western Africa went independent in 1960). Other
large spikes are the ones linked to the regime changes in Portugal in 1975, and in Russia in 1991.
This offer a very wide variety of events, newly independent countries being located in all parts
of the world, and recovering governance of their trade policy in quite different time periods.
2.2 Trade data
The trade data comes from the International Monetary Funds Direction of Trade Statistics
(DOTS). It provides agregate trade flows between countries from 1948 to 2011, covering the
5
Figure 2: Independent countries per year and world region
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majority of the post-war separation events and also the entry of China in the WTO in 2001.
The original DOTS database is compiled by Head et al. (2010) until 2006 and complemented
with gravity control variables (GDPs, populations, RTAs, currency unions, and distance), as
explained in Appendix A of their paper. We extend the data to the most recent years.
3 Is there something special with China?
This section investigates whether the main determinants of trade in the gravity equation explain
the evolution of trade flows between former colonies and China. Using bilateral trade data
going back to 1948, we start with a simple graphical analysis for a set of countries that became
independent at the start of the period. We explore the role of production and export capacity in
shaping colonies’ imports from China and France. We then turn to regressions and follow Head
et al. (2010) and Lavallée and Lochard (2015). We look for an effect of independence on the
level of bilateral trade flows between China and former colonies, suggesting a bilateral change
in the ability to trade.
3.1 Graphical evolution of bilateral trade flows
The graphical analysis presented in figures 1 and 3 provides a first glance at the evolution
of China’s trade patterns with ex-colonies. We choose several examples of former colonies and
graph their trade flows both with their former colonizer and with China. The cases of these three
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ex-colonies, Algeria, Senegal and Ghana, share the advantage of having available data for most
years in the sample. Algeria became independent in 1962 after several years of violent military
conflict, when Senegal’s sepration from the same hegemon (France) was peaceful. Ghana is an
example of independence from the United Kingdom.
Let us start with the example of Algeria (first line, three top boxes). The first graph shows
the evolution through time of Algerias’ shares of total imports from France and from China.
The share of imports from France decreases sharply, from more than 55% in 1950 to around 20%
in 2010. The share of imports from China, instead, rises steadily, and almost catches up with
the French market share at the end of the sample. The evolution is very similar for Senegal,
and lines even cross for Ghana, where China is now a larger source of imports than the United
Kingdom. This pattern of gradual replacement of the former colonizer by China is quite striking
and calls for an investigation of its determinants.
It is useful at this stage to use the gravity equation to guide the next steps of our analysis.
We refer here to the simplest version of gravity, which is the most easy to represent graphically
(the theory-grounded version of gravity will be used in the next sections). The so-called “naive”
gravity equation describes bilateral trade from i to n, Xni, as a function of the two countries’
sizes and bilateral easiness to trade. Measuring bilateral accessibility with 0 ≤ φni ≤ 1, and
GDP with Y :
Xni = GYiYnφni. (1)
The graphs in the first column of figure 3 plots the import share, which, using naive gravity
means
Xni∑
i 6=nXni
=
Yiφni∑
i 6=n Yiφni
.
This equation highlights the straightforward dependence of this import ratio on the size of the
origin country i (here France and China). This is not very informative as a measure of what we
want to capture, i.e. a potential change of trade costs between ex-colonies and China. A more
useful measure should take into account the size of the origin country as a potential supplier.
We thus divide the import share by the share of the origin country in world GDP (Yi/Yw):
Xni∑
i 6=nXni
Yi/Yw
=
φni∑
i 6=n(Yi/Yw)φni
. (2)
The resulting expression, graphed in the second column of figure 3, is proportional to the level
of bilateral trade costs between the two countries, compared to the weighted average of trade
costs from all other partners. When bilateral accessibility is equal to the average, the ratio of
shares is equal to 1. This normalization is represented by the horizontal lines in the second
column of figure 3.
Dividing by the exporter’s share in world production brings noticeable changes to the graph.
In particular, the increase in the share of imports from China is much softened compared to the
7
first column, for the three countries. For Algeria and Senegal, the change is quite evident: the
share of trade from China increases during the first decade after independence up to the point
where trade flows are relatively close to the norm represented by a line equal to 1. The picture
is more involved for Ghana, where the change is mostly apparent at the end of the period.
Accounting for the growth rates in China’s GDP attenuates the spectacular increase in trade
flows displayed for Ghanean imports from China shown in the first column.
At this point, according to equation (2), an upward trend in the shares of imports from
China in column 2 indicates a decrease of the colony’s bilateral trade costs with China, relative
to its average trade cost among all trade partners. Since this is exactly what these graphs aim to
capture, we investigate whether the observed trends do indicate a change in trade preferences for
ex-colonies and China even when we go beyond the case of naive gravity. The developments of
the gravity equation literature since Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) emphasize the need for
“multilateral resistance” (MR) terms as determinants of trade flows. These variables account for
all potential supply sources for the importing country (the inward MR term), and for all possible
destinations for the exporter (the outward MR term). Graphically, those can be approximated
by dividing import shares by the share of the exporting country in world exports, rather than in
world GDP. This is done in column 3 for Algeria, Senegal and Ghana, which displays the share
of the ex-colonie’s imports from the former metropole and from China, divided respectively
by France’s (or Great-Britain’s) and China’s share in world exports. The effect of dividing by
countries’ share in world exports is apparent for the three examples of countries. Importantly,
the remaining upward trend in trade shares disappears for two out of the three countries (Algeria
and Senegal), shedding doubt or a least opening the investigation about the replacement of
colonizer’s trade flows by imports from China.
Looking back on the different representations of trade flows between former-colonies and
China, a clear pattern emerges. Adding controls for gravity determinants in the graphical
representations of colonies’ trade flows weakens the impression that those ex-colonies replaced
the colonial power with China. The figures displayed in the third column are clearly preferable in
terms of consistence with theory, and do not exhibit the catch-up pattern that was so apparent
in figure 1. This also means that unilateral trade determinants such as production and export
capacity are able to explain an important part of these trade flows’ patterns. The need for an
explanation basde on bilateral specificities is attenuated.
We now proceed to proper gravity estimations to investigate whether China’s trade flows to
former colonies exhibit abnormal patterns, once controlling for the outward orientation of the
Chinese economy.
8
Figure 3: Algeria, Senegal and Ghana’s trade with colonizer and with China
Trade shares Trade shares divided Trade shares divided
by share of China in world GDP by share of China in world exports
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The first column contains annual import shares from France and China (line 1), Senegal (line 2) and Ghana (line 3), for Ghana
and China. The second columns keeps the same countries and divides the import shares by the share of France, Ghana or
China in world GDP. The last column divides the import shares by the share of France, Ghana or China in world exports.
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3.2 Gravity estimation of post-independence trade flows with China
Structural gravity refers to trade models in which bilateral trade determinants enter multiplica-
tively the trade equation and contain the following terms:
Xnit =
Yit
Ωit
Xnt
Φnt
φnit, (3)
with Yi =
∑
nXni the value of total production, Xn =
∑
iXni the value of the importer’s total
expenditure, and Ωit and Φnt the multilateral resistance terms defined as
Φnt =
∑
l
φnlt
Y lt
Ωlt and Ωit =
∑
l
φlit
X lt
Φlt. (4)
In equation (3), bilateral trade Xnit is a function of supply, demand, and bilateral frictions.
Compared to the naive gravity equation (1), the supplier term in the structural gravity equation
Sit =
Yit
Ωit
weights total production Yit by the exporter’s multilateral resistance Ωit, and the
demand term Mnt =
Xnt
Φnt
weights total expenditure Xn by the importer’s multilateral resistance
Φn.
The almost unique application of the gravity model has been to estimate the effect of bilateral
trade determinants6. Most trade models express bilateral accessibility through 0 < φni = τ
θ
ni <
1, in which θ is the elasticity of trade flows to trade costs, and trade costs τni contain the bilateral
elements defining the level of frictions to trade between the two partners. The literature typically
investigates two different types of frictions: first, those related to policy decisions, ex-post or
ex-ante: the signature of regional agreements (Baier and Bergstrand (2007), Carrere (2006),
Limão (2016)), GATT membership (Rose (2004), Subramanian and Wei (2007)), or currency
Unions (Rose (2000), Silva and Tenreyro (2010), Glick and Rose (2002)). A second set of papers
is interested in the long-run determinants of trade flows: geographical proximity (Disdier and
Head (2008)), cultural proximity (Felbermayr and Toubal (2010)), through common language
or institutions (Melitz and Toubal (2014), Lewer and Van den Berg (2007)). Among those,
colonial history is very frequent covariate investigated, assumed to affect trade flows through
common institutions and easier communications. It used to be a control variable when studying
another determinant. Only quite recently has the impact of colonial linkage on trade been a
topic of investigation per se (De Sousa and Lochard (2012), Mitchener and Weidenmier (2008)).
So did the effect of independence on trade, studied by (Head et al. (2010) and Lavallée
and Lochard (2015). Both papers are of interest for us because they investigate not only the
direct effect of independence on colonies’ trade flows with the metropole, but also the direct
effect of independence on colonies’ trade flows with the Rest of the world: this is, whether trade
preferences of former colonies have changed with given RoW partners following the break of
6Tinbergen (1962) introduced gravity equations in economics and estimates the respective importance of
British Commonwealth and Belgian trade preferences.
10
colonial ties. Our analysis quantifies the three channels for trade increase described by gravity
equations: our estimates of bilateral China-colonies dummies represent the second channel which
can explain the surge in trade flows discussed in section (1). We thus perform similar estimations
to the above-mentioned papers, however focused on China7.
Declining bilateral trade costs between China and former colonies are likely to make trade
flows easier, and could be due to time-varying variables such as trade policy, or political relations.
We can evaluate whether such a decrease happened after independence by estimating a structural
gravity equation and by adding indicator variables for trade flows between China and former
colonies next to the traditional elements of trade costs.
We follow standard gravity estimation procedures and take logs of equation (3), which gives:
lnXnit = lnSit + lnMnt + lnφnit. (5)
Bilateral trade costs comprise observed time-fixed and time-varying variables and unobserved
bilateral trade cost determinants: lnφnit = Bij+Bijt+εnit. Traditional gravity variables include
geographical distance Dij , and dummies for the following situations: shared border, common
language, trade agreements (RTA, GATT, ACP) and shared currency:
Bni = lnDni + Borderni + Langij + ColHistij + StillColni + ChnColni + ChnStillColni (6)
Bnit = RTAnit + GATTnit + Currnit + ACPEUnit + IndYrnit + IndYrChnnit (7)
The China-colonies indicator variables capture the time-varying bilateral proximity effects out-
side of the formal trade policy variables. Two interesting types of effects may be at work.
First, recent research shows that political influence is able to affect trade flows, in particular
in countries where the public administration is in charge of trade decisions. Fuchs and Klann
(2013) find that the absence of political compliance affects Chinese imports: in our case one
could imagine that the establishment of diplomatic relations by former colonies with the People
Republic of China after its founding, could be rewarded by higher imports from China in the
subsequent years. On the same mechanism but on other countries, Berger et al. (2013) identify
that increased US political influence measured by CIA interventions had large positive effects
on US exports to these countries. In a less tense context, Nitsch (2007) shows that state and
official visits from US, German and French representatives have a trade-increasing effect.
The second possible effect that might be captured by the China-colonies dummies relates
to informal networks. The literature emphasizes that international business networks are very
powerful at influencing trade flows (Chaney (2014) for the theoretical analysis). Changes in
7Note that estimating bilateral China-colonies dummies cannot be used to quantify the redirection of trade
flows following independence, in contrast with the analysis of (Head et al. (2010) and Lavallée and Lochard (2015).
Computing the redirection effect requires to obtain the counterfactual trade flows incorporating the changes in
trade cost and in multilateral resistances. This is what we do in section 4.
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informal proximity between partners might influence the tightening of commercial relations
between China and former colonies (Rauch (2001), Berthou and Ehrhart (2014) among others).
Our interest lies in the evolution of trade flows between former colonies and China in the
years subsequent to their independence. We now explain how we allow the effect to vary year by
year. Following Head et al. (2010), we measure the existence of a colony-China trade specificity
with dummy variables that each correspond to a given number of years since the independence
of the former colony, IndYr1Chnnit to IndYr65Chnnit.
The benchmark to which each year dummy is compared is the average trade level between
colonies and China during colonial time, captured by the dummy variable ChnColni. It is set to
one for all trade flows between colonized countries and China, in both directions. Trade of pairs
of countries outside of our interest group are controled for by suitable variables: ChnStillColni
controls for trade flows between China and ongoing colonies such as Guadeloupe (FR), Aruba
(NL) or Falkland Islands (GBR). Dyadic variables include the independence variables used in
Head et al. (2010) so as to take into account the decreasing effect of separation on bilateral
trade between colonies and metropoles. The IndYr1nit to IndYr65nit bilateral dummies measure
the number of years since independence, for all colonies in the sample, and are defined for flows
between former colonies and their former colonial power. Parallel to the Chinese dummies,
the benchmark trade level during colonial time for the pair is given by a country-pair variable,
ColHistni, which turns on for pairs ever in a colonial relationship. StillColni sets on for ongoing
colonial relationships at the end of the database (2011). Yearly independance dummies for
former colonies thus compute the effect of time with respect to the level during colonial time.
3.3 Estimation issues
The concern about controlling for supply and demand characteristics, highlighted in the graphi-
cal illustration of trade flows, is naturally also part of the gravity estimation strategy. Estimating
trade effects of bilateral determinants requires to account for the time-varying supply, demand,
and alternative destinations or sources of supply (MR terms). Following common practice in
theory-consistent gravity estimation, we control for these variables by using country-time fixed
effects Fit and Fnt which capture the monadic terms ln Sit and ln Mnt. The unilateral time-
varying determinants of trade, population and GDP per capita, drop in specifications using
country-time fixed-effects.
We add country pair dummies Fni to our preferred specification, in order to control for po-
tentially omitted bilateral variables that might correlate with the consequences of independence
and are constant through time (long-run historical relationships, etc.). The China-colonies indi-
cator variables are therefore identified through their change over time. With those country-time
fixed-effects and dyadic dummies, our estimated equation writes:
lnXnit = a+ Fit + Fnt + Fni + bBnit + εnit, (8)
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where εnit captures the unobserved factors that influence bilateral trade between the country
pair, in addition to the vector of observed trade costs Bnit and to the set of fixed-effects. Our
estimations identify China-former colonies specificities in the time-dimension: the timing of
independence was “decided” between the hegemon and the colonized country, which makes its
exogeneity a quite reasonable assumption8.
The second methodological point consists in dealing with zero trade flows. It has become
standard practice to keep the zeroes in bilateral trade regressions through the use of PPML. This
econometric estimator was promoted by Silva and Tenreyro (2006) to account for heteroskedas-
ticity. Its use of the level of trade flow (rather than log of trade flows) as a left-hand side variable
also permits to keep the zeroes in regressions. We report estimates of equation (8) with the
Poisson PMLE to check for robustness to this specification. Computational constraints impede
the simultaneous use of dyadic and country-year fixed-effects, we therefore present regressions
with Poisson and dyadic dummies in parralel to the OLS specification with the same controls.
Last, we investigate the determinants of former colonies initiating to trade with China during
the post-independence period. We investigate whether more years of independence impact
significantly the probability to have positive trade flows within these country pairs. We therefore
estimate the specification with a Linear Probability Model (LPM) with the dependent variable
being a binary indicator for positive flows.
3.4 Gravity controls results
We estimate a gravity equation on trade flows from all countries, between 1948 and 2011. Results
for the unilateral and bilateral control variables figure in Table 1, and partial trade effects for
China-former colonies pairs are graphed in figure 4, in six panels which correspond to the six
specifications used.
Monadic determinants are captured by population and GDP per capita in the benchmark
specification in column 1, which uses OLS and time dummies and thus illustrates the original
atheoretical gravity equation estimation. Fixed-effects are introduced sequentially in columns
2 (dyadic) and 4 (country-time), and used together in column 5. Unilateral variables as well
as time-fixed bilateral determinants are captured by these fixed-effects in column 5, which
displays effects estimated on the remaining time-variation of bilateral variables for a given
country pair. Standard errors in each column are clustered by dyad. Robustness checks using
Poisson estimator with dyadic fixed-effects figure in column 3, and thus differ from column 2
only by the addition of zero flows. Finally, results from the linear probability model with both
sets of fixed-effets on positive flows are shown in the last column.
The first specification shows that increases in GDP per capita and in population affect
8China was a very small actor in international trade in the 1950s and 1960s when most independence events
took place, which makes it very unlikely that ex-colonies decided to separate from their metropole because of
expected higher trade with China
13
Table 1: Gravity regressions control variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. var. ln(flow) flow ln(flow) 0/1
Method OLS OLS PPML OLS OLS OLS
ln Popit 1.013
a 0.356a 0.525a
(0.006) (0.041) (0.080)
ln Popnt 0.845
a 1.002a 0.539a
(0.006) (0.037) (0.071)
ln (GDP/Pop)it 1.145
a 0.743a 0.764a
(0.007) (0.015) (0.023)
ln (GDP/Pop)nt 0.909
a 0.646a 0.676a
(0.007) (0.014) (0.024)
ln Distni -1.033
a -1.323a
(0.015) (0.015)
Shared Borderni 0.652
a 0.459a
(0.071) (0.072)
Languageni 0.671
a 0.559a
(0.031) (0.029)
Colonial Historyni 2.226
a 2.009a
(0.241) (0.149)
Still Colony 2011ni -1.197
c -0.372
(0.632) (0.339)
China - Colni 0.627
c -0.141
(0.329) (0.326)
China - Still colonyni -1.407
a -1.115a
(0.496) (0.376)
FTAnit 0.854
a 0.384a 0.240a 0.604a 0.428a -0.066a
(0.037) (0.023) (0.038) (0.036) (0.025) (0.005)
Both GATTnit 0.193
a 0.210a 0.340a 0.380a 0.175a 0.020a
(0.019) (0.016) (0.037) (0.036) (0.029) (0.004)
Shared Currencynit 0.733
a 0.423a 0.126a 0.810a 0.311a 0.018c
(0.086) (0.059) (0.032) (0.075) (0.052) (0.009)
ACP to EUnit 0.156
a -0.680a -0.200b 0.376a -0.036 0.112a
(0.059) (0.053) (0.100) (0.054) (0.051) (0.008)
Observations 731622 731622 1073038 818071 818071 1358554
R2 0.621 0.834 0.713 0.853 0.647
Country-time fixed-effects - - - yes yes yes
Country-pair fixed-effects - yes yes - yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by dyad. c p<0.1, b p<0.05, a p<0.01 .
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positively trade flows both for the importer and the exporter with coefficients close to unity.
The trade elasticities with respect to the destination variables are both lower than those of
the origin country, in line with Feenstra et al. (2001)’s predictions. The elasticity of trade to
distance (-1.033) is close to the average value (-0.9) reported by Disdier and Head (2008) and to
the average elasticity of -0.93 obtained in Head and Mayer (2014) on the same sample updated
after 2005. Comparing the distance coefficient in columns 1 and 4 shows that it is biased towards
zero when estimated without country-year fixed-effects, which follows the results by Baldwin
and Taglioni (2007). Other time-invariant geographical determinants include contuiguity and a
shared language. The average effect of the border dummy is reported to be between 0.53 and
0.66 by Head and Mayer (2014) according to the specification used. The language indicator has
similar average estimates (0.54 and 0.39). Our results confirm a very comparable impact: 0.652
and 0.671 respectively for the border and language using naive gravity, 0.459 and 0.559 when
controlling for country-time effects.
The ex-post effect of participating in a free trade agreement is positive on country pairs’
trade flows, with a coefficient of 0.854 using basic gravity. This is larger than the average effect of
0.59 reported in the meta-analysis by Cipollina and Salvatici (2010). We also include a dummy
for the pairwise participation in the GATT negociations: its impact is positive using naive or
structural gravity, and so is the estimate of the EU ACP programme directed at developing
countries in the Caribean and Pacific region.
The time-invariant China-colony dummy sets the benchmark to which the yearly China-
colony effects are compared to. It turns on for all flows between China and colonies. Since
post-independence trade between China and a former colony is captured by the annual dummies
following the break-up, ChnColni measures the trade level before separation up to the first year
of independence. Its coefficient appears unstable as it switches sign between columns (1) and (4),
and is non-significant in the latter, suggesting that former colonies’ trade flows with China are
not significantly different from their trade relations with other partners, besides the metropole,
before independence.
ChnStillColni adds to ChnColni to measure trade flows between China and ongoing colonies
throughout the period. Its negative and significant coefficient both in the naive (-1.407) and the
structural estimation (-1.115) indicates that in average, trade flows between colonized countries
and China are less-than-proportional to what they could be, given the size of partners and their
bilateral trade costs. This results will be echoed by our experiment in the next section, inves-
tigating predicted trade flows under the counterfactual absence of independence. The intuition
builds on the trade-creating effect of colonial history for metropoles and colonies (De Sousa
and Lochard (2012)). Our coefficient on the China-ongoing colonies pairs indicates that trade
between ongoing colonies and third countries (such as China) could be higher if colonies were
independent: the redirection effect implies that price indices of both countries absorb the change
in the trade cost of the colony-metropole and generate increased trade flows with ROW.
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The remaining columns in table 1 provide robustness estimations with different estimators
and samples. Results estimated with PPML have the same sign as those estimated with OLS,
and exhibit patterns emphasized in Head and Mayer (2014): the effects of countries’ size tend
to be smaller in absolute value, PPML giving more weight to large flows in levels. Last, column
(6) investigates whether the same determinants as above explain whether two countries have
zero or positive trade flows. The dummy for positive flows is the explained variable, and the
linear probability model is used on the time-varying dyadic determinants, with the full set of
fixed-effects.
3.5 China-colony partial effects
Figure 4 shows the estimates of the yearly effects of Chinese relations with former colonies after
their independence. The six panels correspond to the specifications used in Table 1. Each black
diamond is the exponential of the estimated China-colony effect for a given number of years after
independence. The grey-shaded area represents the 90% confidence interval. Exponentiated
independence effects estimated in Head et al. (2010) are displayed with shaded bullets in the
same panels as a check and comparison.
Estimates shown in the first panel depict an evolution which fits closely with the extraor-
dinary role imputed to China in former colonies’s trade. Trade for these pairs of countries
rises above the pre-independence level during the first decade after independence, and increases
steadily until fifty years following separation. According to these results based on time dum-
mies, Chinese trade flows to ex-colonies could be interpreted as displaying abnormally high
levels, suggesting an unobserved policy change or informal strenghtened bilateral relations fol-
lowing independence. With only time dummies in the estimation, note that it is impossible to
know whether the higher trade between China and former colonies derives from the decrease
of their bilateral trade costs or from the indirect impact of independence from the metropole,
channeled through the price indices. More, since dyadic fixed-effects are not included, we cannot
interpret the effect as working only through the time-dimension. We proceed to the necessary
inclusion of control variables and theory-consistent determinants in the next boxes.
Second panel estimates answer one of these caveats by adding dyadic dummies, which restrict
the identification to time-variation within China-former colonies trade flows. Since this speci-
fication controls for time-invariant variables, the persistent impressive increasing trend shown
by the black diamonds could be interpreted as a confirmation of the first panel’s singular role
of China. For such a conclusion to hold, the remaining checks for rigorous estimation include
taking account of zero trade flows, and using together the full set of fixed-effects. Column 3
estimates the same specification on the sample including zero flows, and results are displayed
in the third panel of figure 4. Estimates are obtained from the Poisson PMLE and using dyadic
fixed-effects. Here again, the outcome prevails in showing China-colonies effects on trade that
are increasing in time.
16
Further panels however prevent from developing the story, and shed light on the different
results obtained when taking into account the size of countries (among which China), hence
their production and export capacity. Country-time fixed-effects are added to OLS in panel 4,
and used together with dyadic fixed effects in panel 5. While estimates show excess trade flows
for a sub-period of the sample, in both panels trade erodes (suddenly in panel 4, steadily in
panel 5) to around 40 to 50% of the expected level. Results obtained with both sets of fixed-
effects are theory-consistent and allow a straightforward interpretation: taking into account the
export and import capacities of countries, trade flows between former colonies and China after
independence are not different from their level during the colonial period. Said differently, trade
flows are not more than proportional to the level that could be expected each year, given the sizes
and accessibilities of countries. In specification 5, which we favor because it includes theory-
grounded controls for size and dyadic time-fixed determinants, former colonies’ trade flows
with China display a decreasing time-trend after their separation from the metropole, which is
however rarely significant. One might think that our results are overly pessimistic since part of
the China-colonies effect might be captured by other variables in the regression. However, no
colonized country installed Chinese as a common language, and no colonized country has signed
a free trade agreement with China before 2004. China signed preferential trade agreements at
the very end of our sample: the China-ASEAN FTA was implemented in 2010. The only earlier
FTA signed by China with a former colony that we consider is with Pakistan and entered into
force in 2008.
While these results relate to the intensive margin of trade, let us last investigate whether any
China-colony specificity can be identified on the likelyhood to develop new trade relationship
within the pair. The last panel displays the effect of years of independence on the probability that
former colonies build new trade relations with China after independence. We code the positive
flows as one and estimate the specification using OLS with dyadic dummies and country-time
fixed-effects. Results from the linear probability model exhibit a similar decreasing time-trend to
the one obtained on the intensive margin, only shifted upwards. The higher probability to trade
with China erodes after thirty years of independence and becomes mostly non significant. The
dyadic fixed-effects focus the interpretation on whithin time variation: the increased probability
to trade is compared to the likelihood of positive flows during the colonial period.
It is useful at this stage to summarize our investigation of the different channels that may
explain the surge in trade flows between China and ex-colonies. In this section we have shown
that China-colonies dummies, standing for specific bilateral trade relations, are not significant
reasons to explain the trade patterns between these pairs of countries. Estimating a structural
gravity equation confirms the naive graphical representations of trade flows, in which the inclu-
sion of the basic determinants of trade is able to suppress, or at least strongly attenuate, the
upward trend in ex-colonies’ share of imports from China. According to our results, so far we
have shown that trade flows between former colonies and China do not rely on bilateral changes
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in trade preferences. On the contrary, the unilateral variables production and export capacity
do account for important determinants of trade flows.
We now turn to the third channel through which a structural gravity equation can explain
a surge in post-independence Chinese trade flows to former colonies.
4 The gravity equation, trade costs and the redirection effect
Although China is thought of having developed intense trade relations in particular with for-
merly colonized countries, gravity estimations on trade flows during 1948-2011 do not highlight
significant coefficients on post-independence trade flows for these pairs.
This finding does not however rule out that former colonies’ level of trade with China is
influenced by their colonial past. Indeed, structural gravity equations state that a trade cost
change does not only generate a Partial Trade Impact (mesured by exponentiating the estimated
coefficient), but is also followed by indirect trade increases for all other pairs, through the
adjustment of multilateral resistances Ωit and Φnt. Head and Mayer (2014) label this effect the
Modular Trade Impact (MTI), which measures the indirect effect of a trade cost change on third-
countries’ trade flows, holding GDPs constant9. In the case of independence, structural gravity
implies that the trade cost increase between former colonial pairs generates a redirection of trade
flows (the MTI) towards all other countries in the world. The redirection channels through price
indices of all countries, which vary following the change in independence trade costs. We may
thus expect that trade between former-colonies and China has risen following independence
events, due to the reorientation of trade flows.
Measuring the indirect effect of independence cannot be achieved by estimation since it
requires to compute a counterfactual situation. We thus quantify the share of trade flows
increase between China and former colonies that is due to the division of colonial empires, by
using the so-called two-step MTI procedure. We first compute the predicted trade level between
China and former colonies, given GDPs and factual bilateral trade costs. We need to compute
this ‘theoretical trade’ matrix mimicking real trade flows, in order to compare it to the second,
alternative trade matrix. The second step is thus to calculate counterfactual trade levels that
would have occured if trade costs hadn’t involved independence of former colonies from their
metropole. The only difference between the two predicted trade levels is thus the historical
separation of colonized countries from their hegemon.
9Note that the General Equilibrium Trade Impact - GETI - could also be computed. It assesses the trade
creation effect, trade diversion, and induced changes in incomes. We concentrate on quantifying the redistribution
effect on trade that is caused by independence. GETI would go further and recalculate the GDPs’ adjustments,
including more than just the the reallocation of trade effect.
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Figure 4: Partial Trade effects of China-former colonies bilateral accessibility
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4.1 Partial effects
The first step involves computing predicted trade. Let us assume that bilateral trade costs
contain the same time-varying determinants as in equation (7), only the China-colony bilateral
effects are omitted because the counterfactual focuses on the effect of independence from the
metropole:
Bnit = RTAnit + GATTnit + Currnit + ACPEUnit + IndYrnit (9)
We use the previously estimated coefficients to reconstruct ln φni for each pair of countries. Note
that because bilateral accessibility contains both time-invariant and time-varying determinants,
all coefficients aren’t available in our preferred specification, which captures time-fixed bilateral
variables through country-pair dummies (column 5 in Table 1). We thus borrow the estimated
coefficients from two different specifications. Coefficients for time-invariant variables (distance,
contiguity, language, and invariant colonial history) are issued from the OLS estimation of the
gravity equation (column 1 in Table 1), to which time dummies and dyadic clusters are added.
Coefficients for time-varying variables (trade agreements, currency unions, and colonial history)
are taken from the gravity estimation with country-time fixed-effects and dyadic dummies. The
bilateral trade cost φni is assembled by exponentiating the sum of products between estimated
coefficients (partial effects) and factual trade cost variables.
Using φni together with factual Yi and Xn, a contraction mapping
10 based on equation (4)
gives Φn and Ωi. Trade costs, GDPs and computed multilateral resistances are then plugged into
equation (3) to obtain predicted factual trade Xnit. Despite the minimal number of variables
and the imposed structure, the “fake” trade obtained through the structural gravity equation
correlates at 73% with real trade.
We are now able to build the counterfactual story by changing one element of bilateral
trade costs. Note that the MTI procedure is able to simulate different scenarios for all variables
that are part of bilateral accessibility. The literature contains various examples of counterfactual
computations using MTI. Glick and Taylor (2010) estimate the cost of military conflicts in terms
of lost trade. Anderson and Yotov (2010) simulate the impact of an agreement on Canadian
provinces’ internal trade. In the following, we simulate the continuity of colonies and focus on
its impact on trade with third countries.
4.2 Counterfactual trade and the ratio of new to original trade
φni is the variable through which we simulate the alternative scenario. By turning off one of
the components, we obtain the new freeness of trade index φ
′
ni. We wish to cancel the increases
in trade costs between colonies and metropoles following independence, hence to cancel the
separation of colonial empires. We choose to do so for all countries whose independence date is
10We use the Stata contraction mapping ado file made available by Head and Mayer (2014) on their gravity
websit https://sites.google.com/site/hiegravity/stata-programs
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later than 1883. Countries that separated before 1883 are thus considered as independent. All
colonial relations that were ongoing in 1883 are coded as continuying in the counterfactual.
The new bilateral accessibility φ
′
ni, combined with Yi and Xn, is plugged again into the
contraction mapping calculation to obtain the counterfactual Ω
′
i and Φ
′
n, and then counterfactual
trade X
′
ni. Note that because the effect runs through an adjustment of multilateral resistances,
all country pairs trade flows are affected by the change in trade costs caused by inversing the
independence events. We thus compute the world matrix of trade that would have prevailed in
the absence of independence events. For any country pair, the comparison between the baseline
trade and the counterfactual trade can be obtained. Following Head and Mayer (2014), for
any change in trade cost the ratio of new bilateral trade to original trade, taking multilateral
changes into account, is given by:
MTIni =
X
′
ni
Xni
= exp[β(B
′
ni −Bni)] ×
Ωi
Ω
′
i
Φn
Φ′n
(10)
The intuition for the effect on Chinese trade flows, particularly since the division of colonial
empires, is the following. With independence, trade costs increase between colonies and their
former metropole. Although historical and institutional proximity may remain tight, separation
creates new barriers to the movement of goods, but also to the exchange of information, to
the flows of capital, services, and people. The gravity model for trade in goods predicts that
higher trade costs impact not only trade between former colonized countries and their head
of empire, but also the rest of world trade flows. Former colonies trade with third countries,
and even trade between pairs of third-countries, increase, however in different proportions. The
increase is due to price indexes absorbing the trade cost change and thus modifying upwards
the denominator of the structural gravity equation. All imports other than from the hegemon
will increase, including the ones from China.
4.3 Results
Part of the increase in trade flows between China and former colonies would not have been
observed under the counterfactual of persistent colonial relationships. We thus expect lower
predicted trade flows associated to the absence of independence events, and thus a ratio of
new to original trade below one. Table 2 displays the ratios of predicted imports from China
without independence over predicted imports from China with independence, for former colonies
of either France, Great-Britain, or Russia. The ratio is computed in levels for each year shown
in the table. The table indicates for example, that in 1970 trade flows between China and
French colonies would have been 7% lower, had independence not happened. Said differently,
the contribution of independence to bilateral trade flows of former colonies with China is an
increase by 7% for the year 1970.
The same comparisons are made for British, and Russian former colonies, the latter number
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Table 2: Predicted ratio of imports from China, without independence
Year France Great-britain Russia
1970 .93 .99
1975 .89 .98
1980 .89 .98
1985 .9 .97
1990 .86 .97
1995 .83 .96 1
2000 .84 .94 .94
2005 .83 .93 .9
2010 .85 .93 .84
Columns contain the ratio of average predicted
imports from China without independence, over
average predicted imports with independence (for
each group of former French, British, or Russian
colonies). Predicted exports are computed ac-
cording to the modular trade impact method fol-
lowing Head and Mayer (2014).
available after independence of its colonies in 1991. All three groups report below one numbers,
indicating a positive effect of independence on outside-pairs trade. The ratio of counterfactual
over predicted trade decreases: this pattern comes from the estimated independence effect,
which gets larger as time passes since independence. It also highlights that the contribution of
separations to the redistribution of trade is larger in recent years. In 2010 trade flows between
China and former colonies are 15% higher than what they would have been with the persistence
of colonial relationships.
These differences in trade flows by year are presented graphically in figure (5). The two
panels display the evolution of the model-predicted shares of imports from China, computed
alternatively with factual trade costs and with counterfactual trade costs that cancel indepen-
dence events. In echo to the previous results, we observe an increasing effect of independence
on trade flows with China, for Algeria, Senegal and Ghana.
Last, table 3 displays the difference in amount of change of trade since 1995. One reads for
instance, that if they were still under colonial domination, between 1995 and 2010 the growth of
French colonies imports from China would have been 15% lower. On average, trade flows have
increased by 15% more than what they would have done under persistent colonial relationships.
At this point it is useful to recall our initial question in this paper, which investigates the
main explanations fot the surge in Chinese trade with former colonies since independence. The
outcome quantifies the third channel contained in structural gravity equations, which requires
to compute counterfactual trade since it operates through the multilateral indices. Results show
that the indirect effect is effective in explaining a substantial part of the trade increase with
China.
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Figure 5: Differences in trade flows with and without independence
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Table 3: Predicted growth in imports from China since 1995, without independence
Year France Great-britain Russia
2000 .88 1.04 .83
2005 .84 .91 .85
2010 .85 .93 .82
Columns contain the ratio of the average change
in predicted exports from China since 1995 for the
group of former French, British, Russian colonies.
Predicted exports are computed according to the
modular trade impact method following Head and
Mayer (2014).
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5 Conclusion
In this paper we investigate the often heard idea that China has taken over an exceptional trade
role in former colonies, replacing the former hegemon in the hierarchy of preferential market
access. Indeed imports of those countries from China have risen markedly over time, to currently
reach similar levels to what the countries import from the former colonizer.
We show that this pattern can be fully explained by the typical trade determinants of the
theory-consistent gravity literature. In other words, contrary to what ex-colonial countries still
import from their former metropole, we don’t find an abnormaly high flow when the exporter
is China.
Our paper can be viewed as a illustration of two important facts. First, the structural
version of gravity is a very useful tool to disentangle the effects of bilateral versus multilateral
frictions on trade. In our case, the impressive increase of China’s exports to the colonial world
is entirely explained by the multilateral part. On the importer side, the multilateral resistance
effect is the ‘normal’ reallocation effect of trade towards countries other than the ex-hegemon
(including China). On the outward side, the gravity equation takes into account that China
has become a more performant exporter (towards all countries in the world) during this period.
Nothing special is left to be explained by a change in the bilateral frictions between ex-colonies
and China. Second, our results might also illustrate the importance of formal trade integration.
Lacking linguistic, historical and cultural linkages with most of the colonial countries, China
thus benefitted from the redirection following independence like any other country. Note that
China did not sign over that period formal preferential agreements that might have triggered
a higher share of trade by newly independent countries. The recent change in the Chinese
attitude towards preferential trade agreements offers on this ground interesting perspective of
future research.
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Table 4: List of colonies in our sample
Year Colony Metropole Year Colony Metropole
1943 Lebanon France 1966 Guyana United Kingdom
1944 Iceland Denmark 1966 Lesotho United Kingdom
1945 North Korea Japan 1967 Yemen United Kingdom
1945 South Korea Japan 1968 Equatorial Guinea Spain
1945 Taiwan Japan 1968 Mauritius United Kingdom
1946 Jordan United Kingdom 1968 Nauru Australia
1946 Philippines United States of America 1968 Swaziland United Kingdom
1946 Syrian Arab Republic France 1970 Fiji United Kingdom
1947 India United Kingdom 1970 Tonga United Kingdom
1947 Pakistan United Kingdom 1971 Bahrain United Kingdom
1948 Burma United Kingdom 1971 Bangladesh Pakistan
1948 Israel United Kingdom 1971 Qatar United Kingdom
1948 Sri Lanka United Kingdom 1971 United Arab Emirates United Kingdom
1949 Indonesia Netherlands 1973 Bahamas United Kingdom
1951 Libya Italy 1974 Grenada United Kingdom
1953 Cambodia France 1974 Guinea-Bissau Portugal
1954 Laos (Democratic Republic) France 1975 Angola Portugal
1954 Viet Nam France 1975 Cape Verde Portugal
1956 Morocco France 1975 Comoros France
1956 Sudan United Kingdom 1975 Mozambique Portugal
1956 Tunisia France 1975 Papua New Guinea Australia
1957 Ghana United Kingdom 1975 Sao Tome and Principe Portugal
1957 Malaysia United Kingdom 1975 Suriname Netherlands
1958 Guinea France 1976 Seychelles United Kingdom
1960 Benin France 1977 Djibouti France
1960 Burkina Faso France 1978 Dominica United Kingdom
1960 Cameroon France 1978 Solomon Islands United Kingdom
1960 Central African Republic France 1978 Tuvalu United Kingdom
1960 Chad France 1979 Kiribati United Kingdom
1960 Congo France 1979 Saint Lucia United Kingdom
1960 Congo (Dem. Rep. of the) Belgium and Luxembourg 1979 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines United Kingdom
1960 Cte d’Ivoire France 1980 Vanuatu France
1960 Gabon France 1980 Zimbabwe United Kingdom
1960 Madagascar France 1981 Antigua and Barbuda United Kingdom
1960 Mali France 1981 Belize United Kingdom
1960 Mauritania France 1983 Saint Kitts and Nevis United Kingdom
1960 Niger France 1984 Brunei Darussalam United Kingdom
1960 Nigeria United Kingdom 1986 Marshall Islands United States of America
1960 Senegal France 1986 Micronesia (Federated States of) United States of America
1960 Somalia Italy 1990 Lithuania Russian Federation
1960 Togo France 1990 Namibia South Africa
1961 Kuwait United Kingdom 1991 Armenia Russian Federation
1961 Sierra Leone United Kingdom 1991 Azerbaijan Russian Federation
1962 Algeria France 1991 Belarus Russian Federation
1962 Burundi Belgium and Luxembourg 1991 Estonia Russian Federation
1962 Jamaica United Kingdom 1991 Georgia Russian Federation
1962 Rwanda Belgium and Luxembourg 1991 Kazakstan Russian Federation
1962 Samoa New Zealand 1991 Kyrgyzstan Russian Federation
1962 Trinidad and Tobago United Kingdom 1991 Latvia Russian Federation
1962 Uganda United Kingdom 1991 Moldova, Rep.of Russian Federation
1963 Kenya United Kingdom 1991 Slovenia Yugoslavia
1963 Singapore United Kingdom 1991 Tajikistan Russian Federation
1964 Malawi United Kingdom 1991 Turkmenistan Russian Federation
1964 Malta United Kingdom 1991 Ukraine Russian Federation
1964 Tanzania United Kingdom 1991 Uzbekistan Russian Federation
1964 Zambia United Kingdom 1993 Eritrea Ethiopia
1965 Gambia United Kingdom 1994 Palau United States of America
1965 Maldives United Kingdom 1995 Bosnia and Herzegovina Yugoslavia
1966 Barbados United Kingdom 1997 Hong Kong United Kingdom
1966 Botswana United Kingdom 1999 Macao Portugal
The table lists the countries that became independent after 1939, with their respective metropole.
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